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THE EVOLVING ROLE OF SECTION 16(b) 
William H. Painter* 
T HE evils which section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 was enacted to prevent are well known. As ex-
pressed in one of the committee reports, this so-called "short-
swing trading" provision was intended "to protect the interests 
of the public against the predatory operations of directors, officers, 
and principal stockholders of corporations by preventing them 
from speculating in the stock of the corporations to which they 
owe a fiduciary duty."2 To curb such speculation, section 16(b) 
provides for recovery by the corporation, or by one or more 
stockholders acting in its behalf, of any "profit realized" from 
purchases and sales of equity securities within a six-month period 
by directors, officers, or beneficial owners of more than ten per-
cent of any class of equity security of the corporation registered 
on a national stock exchange.8 The corporation is thus provided 
with a method of recouping from insiders profits realized either 
through purchase of an equity security followed by its sale at a 
higher price, or from sale of an equity security followed by a 
purchase at a lower price within the six-month period. Once the 
statutory conditions have been fulfilled, it is irrelevant that the 
insider either did not make unfair use of inside information or that 
he might not have intended, at the time he purchased the security, 
to sell it within six months.4 
Section 16(b) has been an effective means of safeguarding the 
• Professor of Law, Villanova University.-Ed. 
1 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963). 
2 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934). See also id. at 55: "Among the most 
vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant 
betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their 
positions of trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, 
to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the un-
scrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who, while not 
directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies 
to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others." 
s For the sake of convenience, such directors, officers, and beneficial stockholders will 
be hereafter referred to as "insiders," the term customarily used, and the profits recover-
able from them under § 16(b) will be referred to as "short swing" profits. 
4 Thus one of the draftsmen of the provision testified before the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency that "you hold the director, irrespective of any intention or 
expectation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely im-
possible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have 
this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove 
that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on the short-swing." 
Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934). 
[649] 
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public against those evils which it was designed to prevent. Yet, 
when considered against the background of the abuses which gave 
rise to it, it is little more than a halfway measure; perhaps of neces-
sity it is but a "crude rule of thumb."5 For one thing, its scope is 
obviously highly restricted. An insider possessed of inside informa-
tion is free to purchase equity securities of his company, wait for 
their value to rise, and then dispose of them after the six-month 
period has elapsed.6 Similarly, if possessed of information which 
portends an imminent fall in price, the insider may sell, wait for 
the six-month period to expire, and then repurchase. To require 
the insider to wait for six months is scarcely a hardship; tax-wise, 
it may be to his advantage, since this is also the period for dis-
tinguishing short and long-term capital gains and losses. Although 
the waiting period may have inconvenienced some potential trad-
ers, it is equally likely that a considerable volume of trading by 
insiders is continuing under circumstances which amount to what 
is in effect an exemption from liability due to the six-month 
restriction in section 16(b). 
In view of the limitations and narrow thrust of the statute, 
it is not surprising that judicial construction of it has been, to put 
it mildly, exceedingly liberal in favor of permitting recovery in 
doubtful situations. Thus, recoveries are maximized wherever 
possible, and the statute has acquired quasi-penal overtones al-
though, on its face, it purports merely to authorize recovery of 
"profit realized" by the insider from short-swing trading. Perhaps 
the best illustration of this is the first case dealing with section 
16(b), Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.7 
In the Smolowe case an action was brought against two di-
rectors, Seskis and Kaplan, who were also president and vice-
president, respectively, of the corporation involved. The action 
was founded upon a series of transactions, all within a six-month 
period, which clearly indicated section 16(b) liability.8 In the 
case of both defendants, the purchase of large blocks of shares was 
followed shortly by sale of equally large holdings. The real prob-
lem, however, concerned the extent of liability. The essence of 
the difficulty is the identification of the shares purchased and sold. 
5 See note 4 supra. 
6 Provided, of course, that he does not purchase the same security within six months 
of the date of disposition (six months before or after such date), since § 16(b) extends to 
sales followed by purchases as well as purchases followed by sales. 
7 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). 
s The transactions involved were as follows (see page 651): 
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The defendants in the Smolowe case argued that this dilemma 
should be resolved by a method similar to that authorized by the 
Internal Revenue Code, i.e., matching purchases and sales of stock 
if the certificates could be identified, a so-called "identity of certi-
ficates" test or, in the absence of such identification, by a rule 
of "first-in-first-out," based on a presumption that the shares first 
acquired were the shares first sold.9 This approach was rejected 
by the court on the ground that, if adopted, it would permit an 
insider with a substantial reserve of stock purchased at a date 
prior to the six-month period to immunize himself from section 

























14,920 shares for $24,245 
584 shares for $905.20 
Kaplan 
Purchases 
5,000 shares for $ 7,750 
200 shares for $ 285 
200 shares for $ 335 
400 shares for $ 924 
1,000 shares for $ 2,560 
300 shares for $ 768 
Sales 
15,800 shares sold to Kaplan 
in discharge of $35,550 in-
debtedness. 
Sales 
200 shares for $308.91 
15,800 shares previously pur-
chased from Seskis in dis-
charge of $35,550 indebted-
ness (see above). 
500 shares for $750 
500 shares for $1,312.50 
200 shares for $525 
800 shares for $2,000 
500 shares for $1,040.20 
200 shares for $250 
2,000 shares for $7,779.03 
1,000 shares for $3,889.52 
O See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-l(c) (1958): "If shares of stock in a corporation are sold or 
transferred by a taxpayer who purchased or acquired lots of stock on different dates at 
different prices, and the lot from which the stock was sold or transferred cannot be 
adequately identified, the stock sold or transferred shall be charged against the earliest of 
such lots purchased or acquired in order to determine the cost or other basis of such stock 
and in order to determine the holding period of such stock • • • • If, on the other hand, 
the lot from which the stock is sold or transferred can be adequately identified, the rule 
stated in the preceding sentence is not applicable ••.. " 
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his sales with certificates attributable to stock purchased at the 
earlier date.10 In addition, any test based on identity of certifi-
cates would render meaningless the express statutory liability for 
sales followed by purchases. Hence, if the test were adopted, the 
court said, "the statute would be substantially emasculated."11 
After thus rejecting both the "identity of certificates" and the 
"first-in-first-out" tests, the court considered another possibility, 
that of determining an average purchase price and an average 
sale price during the six-month period and taking the difference 
between them as the measure of liability. This would in effect 
permit the defendant to offset losses sustained during the period 
against gains, thus reducing his liability for "profit realized" to 
a net figure. This approach was rejected on the ground that the 
statutory purpose precluded a setting off of losses, since any 
contrary rule would tend to stimulate more active trading to re-
duce the chance of a penalty.12 Further, the statute refers to "any" 
profit, and this, the court thought, indicated that losses were not 
to be offset. 
From the Smolowe decision there arose the basic test for the 
computation of section 16(b) profit, that of "lowest-in-highest-
out," requiring a matching of the lowest purchase against the 
highest sale, the next lowest purchase against the next highest 
sale, and so forth. The court reasoned: 
"The statute is broadly remedial. . . . We must suppose that 
the statute was intended to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze all 
possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to estab-
lish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between 
the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stock-
holder and the faithful performance of his duty."18 
That the court was correct in rejecting an "identity of certifi-
cates" rule under the factual situation presented by the Smolowe 
case is hardly open to question. However, the apparent rejection 
of such a rule as inappropriate under any set of circumstances 
10 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1943). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Id. at 239. The court observed that "Kaplan, with his more involved trading, 
benefits by the rule, whereas Seskis, who bought substantially at one time and sold as a 
whole, does not." 
18 Ibid., citing Woods v. City Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); In Te 
Mountain States Power Co., 118 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1941); Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. 
Corp., llO F.2d 333 (1st Cir. 1940); In Te Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 
1936), cases dealing with the disallowance of fees and compensation in bankruptcy and 
reorganization proceedings due to conflicts of interest. 
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is more difficult to justify. Smolowe presented a situation in which 
insiders, endowed with substantial reserves of securities, should 
not be permitted to draw upon such reserves to cover short-term 
speculation and thus immunize themselves from 16(b) liability. 
Does it necessarily follow, however, that the "identity of certi-
ficates" rule would be inappropriate if the insiders were possessed 
of no reserves of stock upon which to draw, where the certificates 
sold were obviously those acquired during the six-month period? 
Curiously enough, the legislative history of section l 6(b) in-
dicates that the draftsmen were aware of the danger of the statute's 
possible "emasculation"14 in a Smolowe situation and that they 
attempted to provide against it by proposing an express provision 
for computing liability by the "lowest-in-highest-out" method. 
This provision, contained in early drafts of the bill, was for some 
unknown reason deleted from the final version.15 However, the 
intent of the draftsmen is clear. Thus Thomas G. Corcoran, one 
of the principal draftsmen, testified with regard to the "lowest-in-
highest-out" provision, "That is in case he [the insider] said, 
'Well, I sold within 6 months after I bought some stock, but the 
stock I sold was not the stock I bought within a 6 months' period. 
It was stock I bought a year before.' " 16 Similarly, he testified later 
that the provision was intended to apply only to a defendant 
whose previous accumulation of the stock might otherwise allow 
him to escape liability.17 Hence it seems that the Smolowe situa-
tion, where the insiders had substantial reserves of stock upon 
which to draw, was uppermost in the minds of the draftsmen. Al-
though, as indicated above, the "lowest-in-highest-out" provision 
was for some reason deleted from the bill in its final form, the 
purpose of the statute seems to require an interpretation such as 
that proposed by Corcoran. In this respect, the Smolowe decision 
appears to be correct. However, to extend this principle beyond 
the Smolowe situation to one where the danger referred to by 
Corcoran is not present, where the insiders had no reserves of 
14 See note 11 supra. 
15 H.R. 7852 and S. 2693, § 15(b)(l), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The deletion of the 
computation provision was relied upon by the defendant in Smolowe to support its 
argument that the "lowest-in-highest-out" formula was thus implicitly rejected by Con• 
gress, but the court glossed over this seemingly troublesome point by observing that the 
failure of Congress "to specify a method of computation may well be thought more of a 
sanction of the formula devised in S. 2693 than an expression of hostility towards it." 
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1943). 
16 Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 6- S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934). 
17 Id. at 6559. 
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stock upon which to draw, seems unnecessary. Hence the "lowest-
in-highest-out" test might have a legitimate application either 
to situations where the insiders had substantial blocks of stock 
to begin with (the Smolowe case), or where the purchases and 
sales could not be matched with corresponding certificates. This 
approach would permit a court to look at the actual facts of trad-
ing within the six-month period and at the same time refuse to 
recognize an attempt to cover sales made therein with certificates 
from a block of stock purchased earlier. That this method of 
computing liability is more realistic than one based on a dogmatic 
application of the "lowest-in-highest-out" formula may be illus-
trated by the following example. 
Suppose that the following series of transactions takes place, 
on the assumption that the insider, prior to the first purchase of 
securities indicated in the table below, is not a stockholder, i.e., 
he is an insider by virtue of his being a director or officer of the 
issuer and he has no reserve of securities upon which to draw to 
cover sales made within the six-month period. 
Date Purchases Sales 
January 2 10 shares at $100 
per share 
January 15 5 shares at $105 
per share 
January 21 15 shares at $110 
per share 
February 5 10 shares at $140 
per share 
February 20 10 shares at $150 
per share 
If the "lowest-in-highest-out" method of matching sales and pur-
chases is used with respect to the above series of transactions, the 
section 16(b) liability will amount to $525, computed by first 
matching the January 2 purchase with the February 20 sale, yield-
ing a profit of $500, then matching the January 15 purchase of 
5 shares with the January 21 sale to yield an additional profit 
of $25. The alternative approach suggested above would yield a 
profit of only $225, since the January 21 sale must by hypothesis 
be matched with the earlier purchases of January 2 and January 
15, yielding $125 profit, with $100 additional profit resulting 
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from the subsequent purchase and sale of 10 shares on February 
5 and February 20, respectively. The matching of the January 2 
purchase with the February 20 sale, required by the "lowest-in-
highest-out" formula, would under the suggested alternative ap-
proach be rejected because it is, under the assumptions given, a 
logical impossibility. Thus the Smolowe rule would be inappli-
cable where the realities of the situation seem to require match-
ing of certificates. Such an approach would not prevent the match-
ing of sales against subsequent purchases at a lower price, since 
the "identity of certificates" rule is obviously inapplicable here. 
It should be apparent from the above discussion that under 
certain conditions any of the suggested rules of computing section 
16(b) liability is bound to result in artificiality. The "lowest-in-
highest-out" rule, rigidly applied, may cause recovery of profits 
which simply do not and cannot logically exist. Similarly, the 
"identity of certificates" rule obviously cannot be squared with 
the express statutory mandate to recover profits resulting from a 
sale followed by a subsequent purchase at a lower price. In view 
of the limitations of each of the rules, dogmatic adherence to any 
one of them seems unwise and hardly in accord with congressional 
intent. The purpose of the statute is not to impose a "penalty" 
for insider trading, 18 nor to authorize the recovery of amounts 
which only by the use of legal fiction could be said to have been 
received by the insider. The statute speaks in terms of "any profit 
realized." a phrase which refers to an existing state of affairs 
rather than a construction based on assumptions which are de-
fective as either improbable or logically impossible. As Senator 
Barkley commented in the hearings already referred to, "It seems 
to me the simple way would be to charge him [the insider] with 
the actual profit."19 This may appear to be a naive oversimplifica-
tion, but it seems to be precisely what Congress attempted to do. 
Thus a judicial gloss based on "lowest-in-highest-out" or, for that 
matter, a dogmatic assertion of any other "rule" for the computa-
tion of liability regardless of the circumstances is, to the extent of 
the resulting artificiality, inconsistent with the purpose of section 
16(b). 
Despite the above difficulties, the "lowest-in-highest-out" for-
mula has been accepted by virtually every subsequent decision 
18 This was considered and rejected in previous versions of the bill, which imposed 
criminal penalties for insider trading. H.R. 7852 and S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). 
19 Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6559 (1934). 
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and commentator as the exclusive method of computing section 
16(b) liability under any given set of facts. The entire problem 
of profit computation was carefully re-examined by the late Judge 
Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton;20 Judge Hand expressly 
reaffirmed the Smolowe doctrine. The defendant in Gratz, being 
a ten percent stock.holder, was in a position similar to that of the 
defendants in Smolowe in having a considerable reserve of stock 
upon which to draw to cover sales made within the six-month 
period. This clearly justified the application of the "lowest-in-
highest-out" formula to his transactions. However, the language 
used by Judge Hand was broad enough to include any insider, 
presumably including one who was not a stock.holder at the com-
mencement of the six-month period. According to his analysis, 
there were but two alternatives: to match purchases and sales in 
such a way as to reduce profits to the lowest possible figure or to 
match them so as to produce the maximum possible profit. The 
latter alternative was of course chosen, based in part on an analogy 
drawn between this situation and that of surcharging a trustee's 
account "when damages are at some unascertainable amount be-
low an upper limit and when the uncertainty arises from the 
defendant's wrong," in which case "the upper limit will be taken 
as the proper amount."21 The court concluded by observing, in 
an oft-quoted phrase, "The crushing liabilities which § l 6(b) 
may impose are apparent; ... it should certainly serve as a warn-
ing, and may prove a deterrent."22 
A recent, similar decision seems to indicate that one who 
violates section 16(b), his status being analogous to that of a trustee 
ex maleficio, is not even permitted to submit proof as to the 
actualities of the situation giving rise to the liability; he must 
submit to an "arbitrary matching of purchases and sales to achieve 
the showing of a maximum profit . . . ."23 Although this case in 
20 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). 
21 Id. at 51-52, citing, interestingly enough, the "Chimney Sweeper's Jewel Case," 
Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505 [K.B. 1722]. 
22 Id. at 52. 
23 Adler v. Klawans, 172 F. Supp. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 
1959). The defendant argued that an earlier holding, Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors 
Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), concerning the determination of the "purchase price" 
of stock acquired pursuant to a transfer by an insider of its assets in exchange for stock 
of the transferee, supported his position that he should be permitted to submit evidence 
as to the details of the transactions within the six-month period to show his actual profit. 
Although some of the language of the Stella case seems highly suggestive in this regard, 
the court in Adler not only held this approach inapplicable to permit an offset of lossell 
against gains, but strongly implied that the rule of maximizing profits would prevail 
regardless of any attempt by the insider to submit proof as to the actual facts of the 
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fact concerned the related but distinct problem of whether the 
defendant would be permitted an offset of losses against gains 
sustained during the six-month period, the offset being disallowed 
in accordance with an express holding on this point in the 
Smolowe case, the language is suggestive and seems to indicate 
that the "lowest-in-highest-out" rule has now become solidified 
as a permanent gloss upon the statute, rewriting it as if the dis-
carded proviso had been expressly adopted.24 The general effect 
is to give the statute an almost penal character, rather than con-
struing it merely as authorization for recovery of gains so as to 
render insider trading unprofitable. For example, that portion 
of the Smolowe holding which prohibits an offset of losses against 
profits25 may result in recovery of "profit realized" despite the 
insider's having sustained a net loss during the six-month period.26 
There are other situations where the insider has received 
equally harsh treatment. Suppose, for example, that one who is 
neither a director, officer, nor beneficial owner of more than ten 
percent of any equity security of an issuer purchases a small 
amount of common stock and then, a few months later, becomes 
a director. If the stock were then sold within six months of the 
date of its purchase, would section 16(b) apply so as to authorize 
recoupment of profits on the transaction? The last sentence of 
section 16(b) provides: "This subsection shall not be construed to 
cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such 
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, 
of the security involved .... " It can be argued that this language 
conveys a negative implication that an insider need not be a di-
rector both at the time of purchase and at the time of sale, as 
distinct from the case where his insider status depends upon being 
a ten percent beneficial owner. On the other hand, where one is 
neither a director, officer, nor beneficial owner, he is for all prac-
tical purposes an outsider and is unlikely to acquire inside infor-
mation which would motivate a purchase of securities. Merely 
transaction. If this is so, the "lowest-in-highest-out" rule has become the sole method of 
computing § 16(b) liability rather than being applicable only in cases of "uncertainty," as 
is the doctrine of trustee ex maleficio, alleged as at least a partial justification for the rule. 
24 Other holdings adhering closely to the Smolowe reasoning are Walet v. Jefferson 
Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1953); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Arkansas 
La. Gas Co. v. Stephens Investment Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956); cf. Stella v. 
Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956). 
2lS Sec text accompanying note 12 supra. 
26 This was in fact the case in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
341 U.S. 920 (1951). 
658 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
because the sale which takes place after the stockholder has 
achieved insider status might have been motivated by inside infor-
mation should not necessarily imply liability, for, as already indi-
cated, the intent of 16(b) seems to envisage that both purchase 
and sale must take place under the prescribed conditions, i.e., in-
sider status.27 Yet, in at least two instances it has been held that, to 
qualify as an insider so as to impose liability based on a subsequent 
sale, a director need not be such at the time of purchase.28 
A similar problem arises with regard to the requirement of 
ten percent beneficial ownership. Suppose that one who is not 
the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any equity 
security of the issuer becomes such by purchase of the requisite 
number of shares. Although he has now achieved insider status, 
does section 16(b) liability extend to the securities which, by 
their purchase, increased the beneficial ownership to more than 
ten percent? As already indicated, the last sentence of section 
16(b) requires that the beneficial owner be "such both at the time 
of purchase and sale." The narrow problem then becomes one 
of whether, under these circumstances, the insider was a beneficial 
owner of more than ten percent "at the time of purchase" even 
though, immediately prior to the purchase, he was not such a 
beneficial owner. The situation is analogous to that of the di-
rector-officer discussed above, and similar considerations appear 
applicable, since, prior to the purchase, such a person is not 
likely to be in a position to acquire inside information. Because 
of the language of 16(b) referred to above,29 the case against lia-
bility on a subsequent sale of the securities in question is stronger 
than in the analogous situation of the director-officer. Yet in Stella 
v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.30 it was held that liability extends 
to the securities which by their purchase made the stockholder a 
ten percent owner. It was thought that, if the rule were other-
wise, "it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block 
of stock, sell it out until his ownership was reduced to less than 
10%, and then repeat the process, ad infinitum."31 This of course 
is true, except that the hypothetical case referred to raises what 
27 See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
28 Adler v. Klawans, 172 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 
1959); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); cf. Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 
205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (stock registered on a national securities exchange sub• 
sequent to its purchase held within the scope of § 16(b) ). 
29 See text accompanying note 27 supra. 
so 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956). 
S1 Id. at 959·60. 
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may be a separate problem, namely whether a rule contrary to 
that adopted by the Stella case might be applied to a purchase 
followed by a sale rather than a sale followed by a purchase. To 
put the matter differently, there is nothing inconsistent with the 
view that, in the hypothetical situation posed by the court in 
Stella, where because of the insider status of a person owning a 
large block of stock he is given access to inside information, a sale 
followed by a purchase which restores him to insider status should 
result in liability; yet this should not be so in the converse situa-
tion, that of a purchase by an outsider followed by a sale within 
six months.82 This difficulty and the somewhat rigid approach of 
the court to it is reminiscent of the problem of computing the ex-
tent of liability, where the "lowest-in-highest-out" rule is adhered 
to as the method of computing "profit realized" regardless of the 
particular factual situation. The judicial attitude implies that the 
statute must have but one interpretation and that its construction 
cannot be made flexible enough to vary with specific situations in 
order to effectuate its intent. That such a flexible approach is 
possible is indicated by its having been adopted judicially in con-
struing another phrase in 16(b)-"purchase and sale." 
Section 16(b) obviously applies only after an insider has en-
gaged in a "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" of an equity 
security. Although the meaning of these terms is usually clear, 
difficult problems of construction have arisen with regard to var-
ious specialized situations, such as the conversion of preferred 
stock, the exercise of warrants and pre-emptive rights to subscribe 
to stock, and exchanges of securities pursuant to mergers and con-
solidations. Since the statute says nothing specifically about those 
situations, the problem becomes one of determining whether each 
type of transaction, such as a conversion of preferred stock, is a 
"purchase" or "sale." 
One of the first cases to consider this problem, Park & Tilford 
v. Schulte,88 involved the conversion of redeemable preferred stock. 
The defendants, owning a majority of the outstanding shares of 
common stock, were in control of the issuer. In addition, they 
owned 6,604 shares of preferred which, unlike the common, was 
not listed on a national securities exchange. The preferred was 
redeemable on ninety days notice at fifty-five dollars per share, the 
stockholder having the right to exercise the conversion privilege 
82 See Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1312 (1957); Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 582, 588 (1957). 
as 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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until the redemption date. Due to a rumor that the issuer was 
about to declare a dividend in kind (liquor) on its common stock, 
the market price of the latter, from late 1943 until May 1944, 
underwent a spectacular rise. On December 20, 1943, the issuer 
gave notice that the preferred was to be redeemed and, on January 
19, 1944, the defendants exercised their conversion privilege. 
Within six months after the conversion they sold the common stock 
acquired as a result thereof. It was held that the conversion was 
a "purchase" within the meaning of section 16(b), the court ob-
serving: 
"Whatever doubt might otherwise exist . . . is dispelled by 
definition of 'purchase' to include 'any contract to buy, pur-
chase, or otherwise acquire'. . . . Defendants did not own 
the common stock in question before they exercised their 
option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they ac-
quired the stock, within the meaning of the Act."84 
This language is exceedingly broad, and there are some who con-
sider that the Park & Tilford holding was sweeping enough to 
render any conversion of preferred stock into common a "pur-
chase" within the meaning of 16(b).85 That this is not so has be-
come obvious with later decisions. In Ferraiolo v. Newman,86 a 
Sixth Circuit case,87 for example, the receipt of common stock of 
Ashland Oil and Refining Co. in exchange for preferred was held 
not to be a "purchase," the Park & Tilford case being distinguished 
on several grounds. It was pointed out that, unlike the defendants 
in Park & Tilford, those in Ferraiolo were not in control of Ash-
land Oil and, since the common stock was worth more than the 
redemption price of the preferred, the conversion of the latter, 
34 Id. at 987. The court also held that the transaction did not fall within the § 16(b) 
exemption provided for an acquisition "in good faith in connection with a debt previously 
contracted" since "the exception is clearly inapplicable to anything except transactions in 
connection with actual debts. It is a strained concept, indeed, to regard preferred stock 
convertible into common as a debt here. Ownership of preferred or common stock creates 
an equity interest, and not a creditor's interest, under these circumstances." Ibid. 
35 See, e.g., Meeker &: Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider 
Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949 (1959); Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 
358 (1959); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719 (1959). 
so 259 F .2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958). 
37 Most of the litigation under § 16(b) has taken place in the Southern District of 
New York and hence has been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
One reason is that, due to listing on the New York or American Stock Exchanges in the 
usual case, venue is properly laid in New York if the sale or purchase is executed there 
even though the buyer and seller are elsewhere. Grossman v. Young, 70 F. Supp. 970 
(S.D.N.Y. 1947). In addition, it should be apparent that courts in the Second Circuit 
have been liberal toward the plaintiff's position in the matter of statutory construction. 
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which was about to be redeemed, was for all practical purposes in-
voluntary. In the Park & Tilford case, on the other hand, the de-
fendants, because of their control of the company, could have 
prevented redemption of their preferred; hence th~ conversion was 
not involuntary. The court in Ferraiolo pointed out that the Ash-
land convertible preferred was listed and actively traded, and, 
unlike the Park & Tilford preferred, the conversion privilege was 
protected against "dilution" in the event of issuance of more com-
mon. Thus the preferred and common stocks of Ashland were 
deemed "economic equivalents" and the receipt of one for the 
other was not the "purchase" of something new. Although the 
reasoning of the Ferraiolo case has been criticized and thought in-
consistent with the broad position taken by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in Park & Tilford,38 it demonstrates at least 
that, with regard to the problem of construing the terms "pur-
chase" and "sale" in section 16(b), the approach has been a flexible 
one, foregoing any enunciation of what the Second Circuit has re-
ferred to as "black-letter rubric.''39 As one writer has put it, the 
approach has been pragmatic rather than technical.4° This is as it 
38 See, e.g., Comment, 11 STAN, L. REV. 358 (1959); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719 (1959). 
The case is also discussed in Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1392 (1959); 45 VA, L. REv. 123 
(1959). Useful discussion of the general problem is contained in Comment, The Scope of 
"Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950); 
Note, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 296 (1959). 
30 Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954). 
'40 Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 358 (1959). For other holdings illustrating the variety 
of approaches to the problem of defining "purchase" and "sale" in specific situations, see 
Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954) (parent 
corporation transferred stock of one subsidiary to another in exchange for its stock, which 
was then distributed in part to parent corporation's stockholders); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 
F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (reclassification of securities); Blau v. 
Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 79 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948) (receipt of stock rights evidencing pre-emptive right to subscribe to new issue); 
Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (receipt of warrants pursuant to 
employment agreement). The Shaw and Truncale cases also involved the interesting ques-
tion of whether gifts of stock, to a charity for example, constitute "sales," holding that 
they do not. See also Truncale v. Blumberg, 83 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). These cases 
have been criticized as offering a loophole for high income tax bracket stockholders to 
avoid § 16(b) liability. See Note, 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 379 (1950); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 
706 (1949). 
Roberts v. Eaton, supra, is interesting factually and contains a useful summary of most 
of the cases in this area. There persons owning 45.9% of the outstanding $5 par value 
common stock of a corporation surrendered their common in a reclassification whereby 
they received an equal number of $1 par value common shares plus the same number of 
$7 par value 40-cent cumulative preferred stock. The preferred stock was then sold to 
two insurance companies and the common to a third purchaser. It was held that the 
receipt of the securities pursuant to the reclassification was not a "purchase." Although 
the reasoning of the decision is somewhat obscure, emphasis was placed on a finding that 
the defendants' interest in the corporation remained proportionately the same, despite 
the reclassification. Although this was the factor substantially relied upon by the trial 
court, the circuit court observed that, although "essential for defendants' position ••• we 
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should be. Yet one wonders why the pragmatic approach has been 
chosen in this area and a relatively inflexible approach taken in 
others, such as those discussed above. 
Another area in which the pragmatic approach has been a-
dopted, at least tentatively, is that of the liability of partners for 
short-swing profits of a partnership, or the converse problem of 
the liability of a partnership for such transactions by a partner. 
There seems to be little question that, where a partnership engages 
in short-swing trading, an insider partner41 at least is liable under 
section 16(b) to the extent of his distributive share, and it is irrel-
evant that the partner had no personal knowledge of the transac-
tions or that he did not expressly authorize them. The statute 
provides for recovery of "any profit realized by him" in the short-
swing transaction.42 Obviously, the question then becomes one of 
determining the extent of "profit realized" by the insider-partner 
in a transaction by his partnership. In Rattner v. Lehman Bros.43 
the court answered this by concluding that the partner was liable 
only for his distributive share of the profits since, "under a literal 
reading of the statute, he cannot be held liable for profits 'realized' 
by other partners from the firm's short-swing transactions."44 The 
do not think it is alone enough to immunize the transaction from application of the stat-
ute." Id. at 86. Also emphasized was the compulsory nature of the exchange, which required 
the approval of two-thirds in interest of the outstanding common stock and received the 
approval of 78%. The fact that the defendants had working control of the corporation, 
as in Park b Tilford, was not considered determinative in view of the time-consuming 
character of the two-thirds vote requirement. Essentially, the court seemed to feel that 
this type of transaction was not one which was likely to lend itself to abuse by insiders, 
since the securities received had no pre-existing market value, the imponderables in-
fluencing such value being no more accessible to insiders than to the public at large. 
For specific exemptions by SEC regulation in connection with certain exchanges of 
securities pursuant to corporate redemptions, simplifications, mergers and consolidations, 
see Rules 16b-5 and 16b-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-5, 240.16b-7 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
41 I.e., a partner who is either a director, officer, or owner of more than ten percent of 
any class of equity security of an issuer whose stock is the subject of the short-swing 
transaction by the partnership. 
42 48 Stat. 881 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958). 
4.3 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952). 
44 The court also relied on Rule 16a-3b, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(b) (1949), providing that 
a partner might, at his option, report either the entire amount of equity security interest 
of the partnership, stating that he had an interest by reason of his membership in the 
partnership but without disclosing the extent of such interest, or file a report only as to 
the amount of the security which represented his proportionate interest in the partnership 
without disclosure of the entire amount held by the latter. Subsequently the rule was 
changed to require disclosure of the entire amount held by the partnership with an option 
to the partner to report the extent of his interest as well. In amending the rule, however, 
the Commission stated that it was "not intended as a modification of the principles govern-
ing liability for short-swing transactions under Section 16(b) as set forth in the case of 
Rattner v. Lehman." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754, Sept. 24, 1952. A 
further amendment of the rule in 1961 deleted the requirement that a partner disclose 
the amount of the issuer's securities held by the partnership, but the substance of the 
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question of the extent of the partner's liability, had he caused the 
firm to undertake the transactions, was expressly reserved but, 
if the reasoning of the case is valid, a literal interpretation of the 
statute would not extend the insider's liability in this situation 
unless his distributive share were increased by some special under-
standing, since the amount of "profit realized" by him remains the 
same. Yet, in transactions carried out on the advice of the insider 
partner or, more likely, with the benefit of inside knowledge com-
municated to the firm by the insider, the purposes of the statute, 
to discourage short-swing trading by insiders directly, or indirectly 
by means of partnerships, would perhaps be best fulfilled if the 
insider partner were held liable for the entire amount of the profit. 
He might then have recourse to the firm or his fellow partners by 
indemnity, partnership agreement, or otherwise. 
A more baffiing question is that of the liability of the firm or 
of the non-insider partners under section 16(b) where the firm 
engages in short-swing trading. If there is no evidence that the 
insider partner caused the firm to make either the purchase or the 
sale, that the insider partner had knowledge of the transaction, or 
that the purchase or sale was made as a result of inside information 
communicated by him to the firm, it seems that the firm cannot be 
held liable.45 In the first case concerning this question, Rattner v. 
Lehman Bros.,46 reliance was placed on the fact that early drafts 
of section 16(b) provided for liability of persons to whom unlawful 
disclosure of inside information was made despite their non-insider 
status, but this theory of liability was eventually abandoned, pre-
sumably because of anticipated difficulties regarding burden of 
proof. 47 The late Judge Learned Hand, concurring, stated: "I 
wish to say nothing as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner to 
represent its interests as a director on the board, the other partners 
would not be liable . . . . The provision eliminated from the 
earlier drafts of the Act does not seem . . . to throw any light at 
all on such a situation as that."48 This reasoning was recently reiter-
ated by a majority of the Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
requirement is still contained in the Commission's instructions to its Forms 3 and 4, used 
for making reports under§ 16(a). See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 n.14 (1962). 
45 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Rattner v. Lehman Bros., 193 F.2d 564 (2d 
Cir. 1952). 
46 Note 45 supra. 
47 Id. at 566; see Rattner v. Lehman Bros., 98 F. Supp. 1009, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). 
48 Rattner v. Lehman Bros., 193 F.2d 564, 567 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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and Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, in Blau v. Lehman.49 There, in 
a factual situation similar to that of the Rattner case, the district 
court expressly found that the transaction had been effected with-
out the knowledge of or consultation with the insider partner.110 
Hence, even assuming the validity of Judge Hand's dictum con-
curring in the Rattner decision,51 there was no evidence that the 
insider partner had been "deputed" by the firm to represent its 
interests on the board of directors. Thus the question presented 
to the Supreme Court was whether liability might exist even 
though the insider partner was not sitting on the company's board 
as a representative of his partnership, and even though the profits 
made by the latter on the transaction were made on the partner-
ship's own initiative, independently of any advice or inside knowl-
edge given it by the insider.52 In affirming the result reached by 
both the district and circuit courts, the Supreme Court stated that 
liability would exist if it were found that the partnership "actually 
functioned as a director" through the insider partner, "who had 
been deputized by [the partnership] ... to perform a director's 
duties not for himself but for [the partnership] .... "58 Thus 
the Supreme Court apparently accepted the qualification sug-
gested in the Rattner case by Judge Hand. 54 Liability in this area 
is thus made to depend upon a finding of fact, namely the existence 
of the requisite "deputization" of the insider partner by the firm 
to represent its interests. 
It has been suggested that the "fact-oriented" or pragmatic 
approach55 taken in the Rattner and Blau holdings is inconsistent 
with the express purpose of Congress in its enactment of section 
16(b), namely the avoidance of a "subjective standard of proof, 
requiring a showing of an actual unfair use of inside informa-
tion. "56 This may be true in a sense, although the use of the term 
"subjective" is open to question. In the context in which it origi-
nated, namely the Smolowe case, the emphasis seems to have been 
upon the lack of any requirement of actual use, or intention to 
use, inside information, rather than upon the supposedly "objec-
49 368 U.S. 403 (1962). 
50 Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afj'd, 286 F.2d 786 
(2d Cir. 1960), afj'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). 
51 See note 48 supra. 
52 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409 (1962). 
53 Id. at 410. 
54 See note 48 supra. 
55 The terminology is the author's. 
56 Judge Clark, dissenting in Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir. 1960), afj'd, 
368 U.S. 403 (1962), quoting from Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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tive measure of proof" intended by draftsmen.57 It hardly follows 
as a logical necessity, however, that Congress intended the appli-
cation of section 16(b) to be purely mechanical and "automatic" 
in every respect. Indeed, as we have seen in at least one other area, 
namely that of the construction of the term "purchase and sale" 
in section 16(b), the judicial approach has been ad hoc or prag-
matic, although hardly for that reason "subjective."58 Thus the 
factual inquiry suggested by the Rattner and Blau approaches, as 
to whether the insider partner has been "deputized" by the firm 
to perform the duties of a director on its behalf, seems perfectly 
consistent with the supposedly "objective" thrust of the statute in 
other respects. If the director has been so "deputized" the firm 
may be held liable without a showing of actual use or intention 
to use inside information, but the initial problem of the status of 
the partner as director vis-a-vis his partnership (i.e., the deputiza-
tion question) remains a real one and worthy of exploration by 
a court before imposing liability. 
THE SPECIAL STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
If anything, there is a pressing need in this area for a greater 
degree of "fact-orientation" or pragmatic analysis. This is graph-
ically illustrated by the Blau and Rattner cases in that, although 
rightly avoiding an "automatic" or even "arbitrary" approach to 
the statute,159 which would render it applicable to all short-swing 
trading by partnerships encompassing a partner-director, the Su-
preme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may 
have failed to appreciate fully the subtleties of the problem. Despite 
Judge Hand's dictum,60 the question of "deputization" is at best 
an oversimplification of the requisite conditions for liability. As 
shown by the recent Special Study of Securities Markets under-
taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission, most broker-
dealer directorships do not arise merely from a firm's "deputiza-
157 See text accompanying note 4 supra. 
158 See note 40 supra. In defending the opposite view, and extending it to what may 
perhaps be its logical conclusion, Professor Loss courageously suggests that "the one policy 
determination which Congress clearly made was that § 16(b) should operate as auto-
matically-indeed, as arbitrarily-as possible, whether the result be to include or exclude. 
One cannot have both automaticity and equity." 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1101-04 
(Supp. 1962). With all deference to the consistency of this point of view, the supposedly 
"automatic" or, worse still, "arbitrary" nature of § 16(b) does not emerge from any 
reading of its legislative history. All that was said was that there need be no showing of 
actual use, or intention to use, inside information. See note 4 supra. 
59 See note 58 supra. 
60 See note 48 supra. 
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tion" of one of its members to represent its interests on a board of 
directors for the purpose of acquiring inside information; rather, 
they usually originate in underwritings of securities.61 Thus it 
is commonly agreed, either under the terms of the underwriting 
commitment or otherwise, that the issuer will use its best efforts 
to insure the election of one or more representatives of the under-
writer as a director. This is justified as a legitimate function of the 
underwriter in performing its continuing duties to the issuer and 
to those who have purchased its securities. The underwriter ad-
vises the issuer regarding its responsibilities to its shareholders, 
assuring an adequate flow of information to the latter from the 
company, as well as compliance with requirements for filing of 
financial statements with the Commission. In addition, the repre-
sentative of the underwriter acts as an "outside director" with a 
broad background of business experience, particularly in the im-
portant area of investment banking.62 In this regard, the Study 
concluded that "there is no occasion to question the merits of 
broker-dealer representation on [a] board of directors. . . ."03 
Hence, if it were not for the problems posed by conflicting inter-
ests, "deputization" would be, if not a necessity, at least an added 
safeguard to all interested parties, as well as an invaluable aid to 
issuers undertaking their first public offering of securities. What, 
then, are the problems raised by conflicting interests among the 
various groups which the broker-dealer director allegedly repre-
sents? 
Essentially, the fundamental conflict is between the director's 
duty to the company and its shareholders, and his obligations to 
his firm and its clients.64 Suppose, for example, that while per-
forming his duties as a director, a representative of a broker-dealer 
learns of an impending unfavorable earnings report or a plan to 
61 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 429 (1963) (hereinafter cited as 
Special Study]. The Special Study was undertaken by a Special Study Group of the SEC, 
under the directorship of Milton H. Cohen, pursuant to P.L. 87-196, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961) and § 19(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
02 Special Study pt. I, at 430-31. 
63 Id. at 437-38. 
64 Including, of course, the important area of services provided for investment com-
panies or mutual funds. See id. pt. I, at 438: "For example, if the broker-dealer represented 
on the board has been a managing underwriter in the flotation of a company's securities, 
obligations to customers in the original allotment and to fellow underwriters and their 
customers may be important. If the same broker-dealer is now making a market, or rec• 
ommending or selling the securities to retail customers, or has investment advisory clients, 
additional motivations and obligations may arise and the potentiality for conflict with the 
director's obligation to his corporation and its stockholders inevitably widens." 
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reduce the dividend. Obviously, he cannot use the inside informa-
tion to speculate on his own, either directly or through others, 
such as relatives, friends, or customers as intermediaries. 65 Is it 
equally clear, however, that he has no duty of disclosure to his 
firm or to its fee-paying or ordinary brokerage customers who may 
be entitled to the benefits of whatever specialized knowledge the 
partners may have?66 Might he and his firm67 be liable to customers 
who buy and sell securities without the benefit of inside knowledge 
and thus suffer losses which otherwise could have been avoided? 
To complete the paradox, if the broker-dealer-director should ad-
vise his customers to take advantage of inside information in their 
securities dealings, may he incur liability to those who deal with 
the broker-dealer's customers in ignorance of the inside knowledge 
possessed by the latter?68 
In view of the conflicting duties arising from the representa-
tion of broker-dealers on boards of directors, one might well ask 
whether the "game is worth the candle," as the expression goes. 
Apparently it is to some, but not to as many as might be supposed. 
The Special Study found, in response to questionnaires distributed 
to every registered broker-dealer in the United States, that, of the 
4,964 firms replying to the questionnaire, only 476 stated that their 
members were directors of one or more companies whose stock 
was traded on an exchange, and 995 stated that members were 
65 Cf. Rothenberg v. Sonnabend, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,f 91226 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1963). 
Sales not followed by purchases, or vice versa, would of course be immune from short-
swing liability. See discussion in text accompanying note 5 supra. In any event, however, 
nondisclosure of inside information under these circumstances may very likely constitute 
a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. See Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961; 60 M1cH. L. REv. 651 (1962). 
66 Sec Special Study pt. 1, at 436, indicating the possibility that some "may have pur• 
chased stock through a firm just because they were told the firm was represented on the 
company's board of directors and that therefore they would be advised quickly of 
developments." As the Special Study pointed out, "In some circumstances ••. it may be 
impossible for a firm to take the position that it has no duty to inform customers of adverse 
developments of a company which are still confidential, since these customers may have 
been led to rely on the firm for this kind of information." Ibid.; sec Comment, Securities 
Regulation: Insider Status in Legal Fiction and Financial Fact-A Proposed Revision to 
Section 16(b), 50 CALIF. L. REv. 500, 506-07 (1962). 
67 Through the doctrine of imputed knowledge. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHlP Acr § 12. 
68 Sec, e.g., the suggestion made by the Study that "the use of inside information for 
the benefit of customers may amount to fraudulent activity in respect of members of 
the public on the other side of customers' transactions." Special Study pt. 1, at 438. 
Liability would presumably be based either on the existence of a common-law fiduciary 
duty of disclosure accompanied by "special circumstances," or a violation of the disclosure 
requirements of § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 thereunder. 
Sec, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 
(3d Cir. 1947); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Corp., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
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directors of one or more companies whose stock was traded solely 
over-the-counter.69 Of this last minority of firms having broker-
dealer directors, only 508 firms indicated that they carried on 
trading over-the-counter in stock of the company while at the same 
time being represented on its board of directors by an officer, direc-
tor, partner or employee.70 As these figures indicate, the problem 
of broker-dealer representation on boards of directors afflicts 
only a minority of industry members numerically speaking, al-
though it would be misleading to suppose that the problem is for 
that reason insignificant in its impact upon the industry, in view 
of the large number of director-partners in certain influential 
brokerage and investment firms. 71 
Assuming that the problem is significant in its impact upon 
securities dealings both on the exchanges and over-the-counter, 
what, if anything, has been the response of industry members to 
the problem? If the Special Study is any barometer of attitudes 
and practices in this area, the responses vary widely. A frequent 
answer to inquiries concerning firm policies was that, "while the 
firm may maintain positions in securities of companies of which a 
member of the firm is a director, the director will not tell his 
partners any nonpublic information."72 Other firms, perhaps with 
less frequency, withdraw from the market and forbid trading in 
stocks where confidential information has been received.78 Still 
others attempt to draw a somewhat subtle distinction between so-
called "hot" or confidential information and other information of 
a more generalized nature which corporate management is willing 
to make available upon request to anyone.74 Finally, a few firms 
69 Special Study pt. I, at 429. 
10 Id. pt. 3, at 44. 
71 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962), 
indicating that Lehman Bros. had partners on 100 boards of directors. See also Comment, 
supra note 66, at 511-14. 
72 Special Study pt. I, at 434. One somewhat humorous illustration of this "insulation" 
technique was reported to have come from a partner of Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades &: Co., 
who stated: "Kelly [partner in charge of the trading department] is on the 16th floor at the 
end. I am on the seventh floor. To get to the 16th floor, and you cannot get him on the 
telephone, you have got to go out, get on the elevator to the 12th floor, change on the 12th 
floor and go to the 16th floor. If you have ever been in that office, the counterroom, I 
guarantee you, you cannot discuss anything in there. All the rest of the partners are 
down on the seventh floor. Geographically, in our firm we do not have much of a prob-
lem." Ibid. 
73 Id. at 433-34. 
74 Id. at 433. Thus one partner stated: "I ascertain from management in most 
cases, or in all cases, if I am going to make this information available to anyone. I say, 
'Is this information available generally to any part of the investing public that wants to 
find it?' .•• If that is the situation, I do not wait 6 months until the public report comes 
out on the company. If this is not secret information and you are sure this is information 
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candidly admit that they consider it their prerogative to make 
whatever use they wish of confidential information.75 
Aside from the obvious perils of the approach last mentioned 
-that which considers it the "prerogative" of the broker-dealer 
director and his firm to make use of inside information-this 
uninhibited view of the problem is essentially not a solution at 
all but merely a determination to run the risks of section 16(b) 
liability. To draw a distinction between "hot" inside information 
and other forms of information which, although perhaps technically 
available "upon request" to the investing public, is unknown to 
them, is doubtful to say the least. Even if the information is avail-
able "on the street" in the form of rumor, the insider has the 
peculiar advantage of being in a position to confirm its accuracy 
and to act accordingly. Thus, in the final analysis, it is only the 
first two of the above-mentioned approaches which have a sub-
stantial chance of success in avoiding conflict of interest. Insulating 
the broker-dealer director from trading activities depends for its 
efficacy upon the extent to which firm members and employees 
take their obligations seriously.76 In addition, the nondisclosure 
to customers which follows may, as already suggested, involve other 
risks of liability for breach of fiduciary duty.77 The only com-
pletely safe solution is that of withdrawal from trading in a security 
concerning which confidential information has been received. 
This, although acceptable to some, is no doubt extremely unpalat-
able and unsatisfactory to others as a solution to the dilemma. The 
Special Study, in fact, found that, if faced with the alternative of 
that would be available in like manner, you do not try to jump the market but, at the 
same time, you do not want to stand back and look stupid. This is a very difficult area to 
move in. This is why we have this policy of not tying our trading department's hands with 
inside knowledge, because what is inside knowledge to me is already on the street in about 
9 cases out of IO. That is why we get the company to release the information as soon as 
possible, to remove the problem." Ibid. 
711 Id. at 434-35. "There arc probably only two alternatives •••• You can either take 
the position that a public release of information is necessary before you can act on it, 
or you can take the position that having been the company's main underwriter and 
investment banker you are therefore entitled to that kind of information; that you took 
a risk in originally offering the stock to the public and therefore can make the best 
possible use of it." Ibid. 
76 See New York Stock Exchange, M.F. Educational Cir. No. 162, June 22, 1962, 
apparently endorsing the "insulation" approach. 
77 See text accompanying note 65 supra; Special Study pt. I, at 435: "[I]f a broker-
dealer serving as a director has material information, the disclosure of which is necessary 
to prevent fraud on a customer, or in a transaction in which he participates, it must be 
disclosed; and that if the broker-dealer believes that he is under a duty to the corpora-
tion not to disclose the information, his only alternative is not to participate in trans-
actions in the security until disclosure may be made. [Citing Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 
33 S.E.C. 311 (1952).)" 
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ceasing trading activities or resigning as directors of the corpora-
tions concerned, many broker-dealers would choose the latter 
course of action. 78 In any event, it is in this direction, toward the 
ultimate choice of "to trade and not to direct" or "to direct and not 
to trade" that the recommendations of the Special Study regarding 
section 16(b) are directed. 
The broad range of suggestions and proposals which emerged 
from the Special Study is beyond the reach of this discussion. Some 
consideration should nonetheless be given to the impact of the 
proposals upon section 16(b). Briefly, the broad pattern of the 
proposals is to extend the protections of sections 13, 14, and 16 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to certain issuers of unlisted 
securities, designated as "OTC-listed." Aside from issuers volun-
tarily electing to be included in the "OTC-listed" category, the 
Special Study proposal included all issuers of unlisted securities 
having 750 or more equity security holders of record and/or known 
beneficial holders, and this classification would "as rapidly as 
feasible" be broadened further to include issuers having 300 or 
more such security holders, subject to certain exemptions.70 
The Special Study proposed another important change, namely 
that section 16(b) be amended "to permit recovery of short-swing 
profits of a broker-dealer firm where one of the principals is a 
director, [thereby] 'reversing' Blau v. Lehman."80 The Commis-
sion would, under this proposal, be "empowered to provide limited 
exemptions [from the operation of section 16(b)] on an affirmative 
showing both of unique need of the issuer or class of issuers and 
necessity and appropriateness in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors."81 Thus the Special Study found no need 
for a general exemption applicable to all broker-dealers who "make 
markets" in securities of issuers on whose boards of directors they 
are represented. In fact, the Special Study stated, "Entirely apart 
from the merits of broker-dealers' services on corporate boards 
generally, the combination of making a market in an issue (as 
'sponsor' or otherwise) and representation on the board of the 
issuer appears to be in most, if not all, circumstances an unneces-
sary one; and when consideration is given to the potential conflicts 
78 See Special Study pt. 3, at 48. 
79 Id. at 62. This has been modified in the legislation introduced by the Commission 
as indicated in the text accompanying note 91 infra. 
80 Special Study pL 3, at 64. 
s1 Ibid. 
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of interest inherent in the combination, the balance clearly does 
not lie in favor of a general and broad exemption."82 
As indicated previously, one of the supposed justifications for 
broker-dealer representation on the board of directors of an issuer 
is to insure an adequate flow of information to the issuer's security 
holders and to the public.83 If the other proposed amendments to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are adopted, particularly the 
extension of section 13 (requiring the filing of periodic reports and 
financial statements) and section 14 (regulating proxy solicitation), 
this need to inform the public will be largely fulfilled, rendering 
broker-dealer representation on the board unnecessary.84 More-
over, the supposed obligation of broker-dealers underwriting secu-
rities issues to continue to make the market in such issues can be 
fulfilled without the necessity of representation on the board of 
directors.85 Thus if, as a result of the proposed amendment of 
section 16(b) to overcome the effect of Blau v. Lehman,86 broker-
dealers are persuaded to forego representation on the board of 
directors, the public is not likely to suffer greatly and may in fact 
benefit from reduction of the likelihood of misuse of inside infor-
mation.87 To be sure, the issuer would be deprived of the services 
of its "outside" director, but there are assuredly others of similar 
background and experience who could fill his shoes without at the 
same time being obliged to make a market in the company's secu-
rities. If a broker-dealer should choose board of directors repre-
sentation and forego making a market in the issuer's securities, a 
choice which few broker-dealers are likely to make,88 his with-
drawal from the market as "sponsor" would not in most cases 
affect the price of the securities adversely, according to statistical 
findings of the Special Study.89 Finally, if in some unusual situ-
ation it were found necessary for a broker-dealer to be represented 
on an issuer's board of directors while continuing to act as "spon-
sor" in making a market in its securities, the Commission would 
have power to grant a limited exemption.90 
82 Id. at 63. 
83 See text accompanying note 61 supra. 
84 See Special Study pt. 3, at 47. 
SIS Id. at 49. 
86 See text accompanying note 79 supra. 
87 Except possibly those who, as fee-paying customers of the broker-dealer or other-
wise, may hitherto have felt themselves entitled to the benefit of inside information. See 
note 66 supra. Query, however, whether they should continue to feel entitled to such 
information if it were not legally permissible for broker-dealers to obtain and act upon it. 
BB See note 78 supra. 
so See Special Study pt. 3, at 49-51. 
oo See text accompanying note 80 supra; Special Study pt. 3, at 62. 
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LEGISLATION PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION 
Against the background of the Special Study and its legislative 
proposals, two substantially identical bills were introduced in 
Congress at the request of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. 91 The overall pattern of the legislation resembles the Special 
Study proposals, except that the portion of the over-the-counter 
securities industry subjected to regulation has been modified so 
as to include, ultimately, only issuers having over one million 
dollars in total assets and a class of equity security ( other than an 
exempted security) held of record by 500 or more persons.92 The 
only specific change with regard to insider trading would be the 
addition of a new subsection to section 16 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to read as follows: 
"(d) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not 
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the 
provisions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to 
any sale, of an equity security not then or theretofore held 
by him in an investment account, by a broker or dealer in 
the ordinary course of his business and incident to the estab-
lishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market 
for such security. The Commission may, by such rules and 
regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with re-
spect to securities held in an investment account and trans-
actions made in the ordinary course of business and incident 
to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or second-
ary market."93 
91 H.R. 6789 and S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The Senate Bill had been passed 
as of this writing. 
92 S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1963). Initially, only issuers having 750 or more 
equity security holders of record would be covered, but the lower limit would become 
effective within 120 days after the last day of an issuer's fiscal year ended after two years 
from the effective date of the new legislation. The Special Study Group had proposed 
300 record and/or known beneficial holders. See text preceding note 79 supra. The SO• 
called Frear-Fulbright proposal to regulate the over-the-counter market resembled the 
present legislation in several respects but used different cxemptive criteria, i.e., less than 
$3,000,000 in assets or fewer than 300 security holders. S. 2408, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). 
93 S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § S(b) (1963). As passed by the Senate, the bill contains 
three relatively minor clarifying changes of a technical nature. The reference to "broker 
or" before the term "dealer" in line 5 of the quoted version supra has been deleted. The 
phrase "by him" has been added after the word "maintenance" in line 7. The following 
parenthetical reference has been inserted between the words "market" and "for" in lines 
7 &: 8: "(otherwise than on a national securities exchange or an exchange exempted 
from registration under section 5 of this title)." The reference to a "broker" in the bill 
as originally submitted was thought to be misleading since the exemption is available 
only to a dealer, although a dealer who is also a broker can qualify. Similarly, the other 
changes clarify the fact that the exemption applies only to over-the-counter market-
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The basic effect of this change in section 16 would be provision 
of an added exemption for brokers or dealers, otherwise within the 
scope of section 16, who deal in equity securities not held by them 
in an investment account "in the ordinary course of . . . business 
and incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary 
or secondary market" for the securities. Thus the Commission has 
endorsed a general exemption for market-making activities of 
broker-dealers, rather than the limited exemption or ad hoc ap-
proach advocated by the Special Study.94 Non-market-making 
activities of brokers or dealers, or dealings in securities held in an 
investment account or not in the ordinary course of business would 
be left subject to section 16.95 The Commission would have rule-
making power to prescribe when securities are held in an "invest-
ment account" and when transactions would be considered in the 
ordinary course of business and incident. to primary or second-
ary market-making activities. In general, however, a dealer who 
is "generally considered by other brokers or dealers having 
orders to buy or sell a security as the principal source or market 
for the execution of such orders" would be regarded as making 
the primary market. Secondary market makers are those who 
"trade in a security regularly, but on a more limited basis."96 
In view of the rather persuasive arguments advanced by the 
Special Study against granting a broad exemption for market-
making activities of brokers or dealers,97 the legislation introduced 
by the Commission is somewhat surprising. The reasons given for 
the change98 do not appear particularly convincing. Essentially, 
they amount to an evaluation of the existing statutory safeguards 
making and that the dealer who claims the exemption must himself be making the 
primary or secondary market. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Technical 
changes were also made in § 16(a) of the act by both the SEC-proposed version and by 
that finally adopted by the Senate, as well as the redesignation of § 16(d) of the present 
statute as new § 16(e). 
04 Special Study pt. 3, at 63; see text accompanying note 82 supra. The stated reason 
for the departure from the Special Study recommendations is to obviate the necessity of 
considering applications for exemptions on an ad hoc basis, together with the existing 
power of the Commission to "curb by alternative means the misuse of inside information" 
by analysis of reports filed pursuant to § 16(a) of the act, periodic inspections of broker-
dealers by Commission staff members, enforcement of the antifraud sections of the 1933 
and 1934 Acts, together with the broker-dealer registration revocation power under § I5(b) 
of the 1934 Act. Statement of the SEC, Hearings on S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1963) 
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
05 Technical Statement of the SEC Relating to S. 1642, Hearings 359. 
06 ibid. See also Hearings 71-73. 
97 See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
os See note 94 supra. 
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as adequate protection against the abuses of insider trading by 
broker-dealers, a conclusion which is in rather striking contrast to 
the entire import of the Special Study. Perhaps, as implied by the 
Commission in the statement accompanying the proposed legis-
lation, the necessity for consideration of exemption applications 
on an ad hoc basis was envisaged as unduly burdensome.00 In 
addition, it is possible that there is implicit in the Commission's 
re-evaluation of the Study proposals a determination that a general 
ban on market-making activities would have an adverse effect on 
the liquidity and price activity of many securities, although such 
a conclusion is inconsistent with the express results of statistical 
analyses conducted by the Study.100 
A further illustration of the Commission's departure from the 
more stringent recommendations of the Study is the former's fail-
ure to adopt an express legislative repudiation of Blau v. Lehman. 
As already stated, the Study recommended that section 16(b) be 
amended "to permit recovery of short-swing profits of a broker-
dealer firm where one of the principals is a director, 'reversing' 
Blau v. Lehman."101 The proposed legislation merely provides for 
an exemption for market-making activities of brokers or dealers 
and thus, technically speaking, Blau v. Lehman has remained un-
touched. Hence the question of whether a firm has "deputized" 
one of its members or employees to represent it on a board of 
directors remains relevant, if not determinative of its liability, 
although the Study found the "deputization" test distasteful and 
urged that it be abandoned.102 On the other hand, the exemption 
for market-making activities which the proposed legislation has 
added to section 16(b) may create a powerful negative inference 
that non-market-making activities are subject to section 16(b) 
despite absence of "deputization."103 This inference is addition-
99 Ibid. 
100 See Special Study pt. 3, at 49-51. 
101 Id. at 64; see note 80 supra. 
102 Special Study pt. 3, at 44 n.87. 
103 See Technical Statement of the SEC Relating to S. 1642, Hearings 359: "A broker-
dealer making an over-the-counter market for the securities of such a company, who is 
also one of its officers or directors, is now subject to the provisions of sections 16(b) and 
16(c). His market-making transactions would be exempted by the new section 16(d)." 
Although the quoted statement was made with regard to closed-end investment com-
panies, to which § 16(b) is made applicable by means of § 30(£) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, it obviously applies to other issuers as well. Note the following addi-
tional statement of the Commission conceming the availability of the exemption: 
"The exemption is intended only for transactions in the over-the-counter market. 
The New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges have adopted rules prohibiting 
a specialist on these exchanges from being an officer or director of a company in 
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ally strengthened by the highly controversial status of the Blau v. 
Lehman holding, as indicated by the dissents in the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
Assuming for the purpose of discussion that the Blau case 
would be legislatively "reversed" if the new statute were adopted, 
although the question of "deputization" might become irrelevant 
in the case of non-market-making activities of broker-dealer direc-
tors, further opportunities for statutory construction by the courts 
will arise with regard to the scope of the exemption and such 
language as "investment account" and "establishment or mainte-
nance of a primary or secondary market." Although the Commis-
sion is given power to make rules and regulations in this area, it 
would be naive to suppose that this will foreclose judicial in-
quiry.104 In fact, if experience is any guide in this regard, the more 
elaborate the statute and the greater the proliferation of rules and 
regulations under it, the more courts will be called upon to con-
strue their meaning and intent. For example, the new exemption 
for market-making activities raises the question of the status of se-
curities not held in an investment account, as regards computing 
whether a broker-dealer is a beneficial owner of more than ten 
percent of a class of equity security. As indicated previously, a 
person may become an insider under section 16(b) by having such 
ownership in excess of ten percent, as well as by being an officer 
or director of an issuer, and this obviously applies to broker-
dealers as well. The Commission has already taken the position 
that, in determining the requisite extent of ownership, securities 
held in an investment account are to be aggregated with those in 
whose securities he specializes. The Commission also has power, under section 11 of 
the act, to prohibit such affiliations." Ibid. 
The difference between a "specialist" and a "market-maker" may be one of the extent 
of participation. See the following exchange in the Hearings 71: 
"Senator Williams: Does this [market-making] compare in any degree to the specialist 
who makes the market for a stock listed on one of the exchanges? 
"Mr. Haack: [Member, Board of Governors, NASD]. I would say there is a degree 
of similarity. One difference is that a specialist on the floor of an exchange sees al-
most all of the traffic in that particular security, whereas a marketmaker might be I of 
IO or 15 or 20 people who would be acting as a principal, and he would not be 
exposed to all of the trading that takes place. But there is a comparability of 
function." 
10, Thus the scope and meaning of the rules may be called into question; in some 
instances, even their validity may be disputed. See, e.g., the checkered career through the 
courts of the exemption for certain stock bonus, profit-sharing, and other incentive-type 
plans of former Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1949), in such cases as Greene v. Dietz, 
247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957); Van Aalten v. Hurley, 176 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 
Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Continental Oil Co. v. Perlitz, 
176 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1959), and the subsequent amendment of the rule to bring it 
more into accord with judicial concepts of the proper scope of rule-making power under 
the statute. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6275, May 26, 1960. 
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the trading or "market-making" account.105 This comparatively 
strict approach to the exemption is probably justified by a literal 
reading of the statute, since the exemption applies only to pur-
chases and sales of securities not held in an investment account and 
says nothing about whether they may be used to determine the 
ownership requirement. In addition, section 16(a), to which sec-
tion 16(b) refers by its use of the phrase "such beneficial owner," 
mentions a "beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any 
class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)," and 
the term "exempted security," defined in section 3(a)(l2) of the 
Exchange Act, apparently does not relate to the exemption con-
tained in new subsection 16(d), which is more akin to a transaction 
exemption, dealing as it does with purchases and sales, etc. Finally, 
as previously indicated, the Commission would be given power, 
under the terms of the exemption in section 16(d), to define 
its scope; thus the Commission's views with regard to the ten per-
cent requirement are likely to be upheld judicially. 
Other problems will no doubt arise with regard to the applica-
bility of section 16(b) and its new exemption. Thus, although 
the recent cases dealing with the question of whether a partner-
ship may become a "director" for the purpose of recovery of short-
swing profits have dealt only with partnerships, similar problems 
are likely to arise with regard to the incorporated brokerage houses 
which are becoming increasingly popular. Obviously, if a partner-
ship may, under some circumstances, be held liable for short-swing 
profits, no different result should follow merely from the fact of 
its incorporation. In fact, it is arguable that, in some cases, the 
shareholders of an incorporated brokerage house should themselves 
be held liable. This would be so not merely in those instances 
where the shareholder, because of corporate "thin-ness" or other 
factors leading to disregard of the corporate entity,106 would be 
held liable for corporate obligations generally, including sec-
tion 16(b) liability, but also in cases where, because of the extent 
of the shareholder's interest in the corporation, he might fall 
directly within the statutory language. Thus section 16(a) refers 
to "every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner 
of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security .... " 
If X owns 51 percent of the stock in the brokerage firm and the 
105 Technical Statement of the SEC Relating to S. 1642, Hearings 359. 
106 See generally BAKER &: CARY, CORPORATIONS 394-96 (3d ed. 1958); Douglas &: Shanks, 
Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929), 
collecting some of the better known source materials. 
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firm owns more than 20 percent of the stock of ABC Corp., which 
is registe:red on a national securities exchange, or "OTC-listed" 
under the new legislation, X arguably is "indirectly" the beneficial 
owner of 51 percent of 20 percent, or more than 10 percent of 
ABC Corp., and thus is himself an "insider." The situation has 
never arisen but, if it should, one could well foresee liability im-
posed on the assumption that a person owning such a substantial 
interest in an "insider" corporation is likely to be in possession of 
information known to the corporation and thus, functionally as 
well as literally, the statute should apply to him. 
It is all too apparent that, despite the continuing elucidation 
of the purpose and scope of section 16(b), there is a comparatively 
wide area in which questions have yet to be resolved by the courts 
and the Commission. In construing the statute, one may hope that 
the approach will be functional and pragmatic-not rigid, "au-
tomatic," or "arbitrary" in the supposed "objective" or "penal" 
tradition of Smolowe v. Delendo.101 If, as one early commentator 
pointed out, section 16(b) is itself a bed of Procrustes, "imposing 
an artificial test of liability which bears no true relation to the evil 
sought to be remedied,"108 it would seem unwise to add to its 
artificiality by construing it in a Procrustean manner out of some 
supposed "objectivity" in the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the overall intent of the statute is to serve as a 
"deterrent" and for that reason it may be well in some instances to 
impose a "crushing liability,"109 to hypostasize this attitude or emo-
tional bias into an inflexible "rule" to govern all instances, fore-
closing inquiry into the facts of the case,110 would impose extremely 
harsh liability, doubtfully intended by Congress. As we have seen, 
the primary if not only reason for the choice of a more or less 
arbitrary period of six months for the short-swing transaction was 
the presumed difficulty of proving an actual intent to make use of 
inside information.111 The "crude rule of thumb" solution which 
107 See text accompanying note 7 supra. See also the related problem of when a person 
becomes an insider, discussed in text accompanying note 26 supra. 
108 Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1, 4.5 
(1934). 
109 See the late Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). 
110 See Adler v. Klawans, 172 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 840 (2d 
Cir, 1959). • 
111 See note 4 supra, 
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Congress adopted to dispense with this difficulty should not consti-
tute an implied mandate to ignore the facts of the case as well. 
The statute itself has been too much criticized for its overly me-
chanical approach112 to be burdened with a further arbitrary gloss 
placed upon it by the courts. To put the matter differently, in 
view of the history and apparent purpose of this legislation, the 
fundamental consideration in all doubtful cases should be "not 
whether the defendant actually used inside knowledge to profit, 
but rather whether the situation was one in which such inside 
knowledge could have been advantageously used."113 
If the function of section 16(b) is at all relevant, and to say 
that it is not is to discount the whole of the recent development of 
its construction in the courts as well as the meaning behind the 
efforts of the Special Study and the spirit of the proposed legis-
lation, the statute should be construed functionally-and not me-
chanically, like some modern equivalent of the Rule in Shelley's 
Case. It is indeed fortunate, in view of past judicial excesses 
in applying section 16(b), that the courts, Congress, and even the 
Commission114 are coming to realize the necessity for a more 
functional, if not pragmatic, approach to this useful provision. 
112 See, e.g., the statement of Mr. George Rea, former president of the New York 
Curb Exchange (now the American Stock Exchange) that "This part of the law has, in 
truth, burned down the barn in order to kill the rats." 4 Proposed Amendments to the 
Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Hearings before House 
Comm. on Interstate b Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. vol. 4, at 1299 (1941). For 
a summary of further criticism, see 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1087-90 (2d ed. 1961). 
113 See Note, 72 HARV, L. REv. 1392, 1393 (1959). 
114 See Special Study pt. I, at 439-40: "The multitude and variety of possibilities of 
conflict in the securities business make it difficult, if not dangerous, to generalize as to 
the problems presented or possible remedies." 
